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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
PART ONE: 
Was it reversible error for the trial court to 
refuse to admit evidence that the defendant driver fled the 
scene of an automobile/pedestrian accident in which he was 
involved? 
PART TWO°: 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion by 
refusing to allow into evidence the plaintiff's expert 
opinion testimony as to the cause of the accident? If so, 
was this error cured by the later admission of this 
testimony? 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
PART ONE: 
Utah Rules of Evidence, 103, 401, 402 and 403, 
will determine the outcome of PART ONE of this appeal. Due 
to the length of these provisions, the text of each is set 
out at Appendix A of this brief. 
PART TWO: 
Utah Rules of Evidence, 702, 703, 704 and 705 will 
determine the outcome of PART TWO of this appeal. Due to 
the length of these provisions, the text of each is set out 
at Appendix B of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Joshua Fisher, (hereafter Fisher), 
was injured in an auto-pedestrian accident in Salt Lake 
City, Utah. The defendant, Warren Trapp (hereafter Trapp) , 
was the driver of the vehicle. The case was tried before a 
jury. 
Fisher was unable to testify on his own behalf 
about the accident. His injuries blocked his memory of what 
happened. (Record at 303.) 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Trapp. 
The court denied plaintiff's timely motion for a new trial. 
(Record at 242.) 
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PART ONE: POST-ACCIDENT FLIGHT 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
RELATING TO POST-ACCIDENT FLIGHT 
During an JLn camera hearing prior to trial, Trapp 
admitted he was a hit-and-run driver. Specifically, Trapp 
admitted leaving the accident scene. He eventually returned 
to the accident site and spoke to a police officer. Trapp 
still did not identify himself as the driver of the car. 
Only later did Trapp telephone the police and admit that he 
hit Fisher. (Record at 270.) 
Trapp made a motion iji limine to exclude evidence 
that he was a hit-and-run driver. (Record at 271.) The 
trial court granted Trappfs motion. The basis of the ruling 
was that possible prejudice outweighed the probative value 
of the particular evidence. (Record at 27 3.) 
No evidence of the hit-and-run was introduced at 
trial. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Trapp. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Evidence of flight from the scene of an accident 
may be an admission of guilt and should have been admitted. 
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POINT I 
EVIDENCE OF POST ACCIDENT 
FLIGHT IS PROBATIVE 
From early on, Courts have consistently held that 
evidence of a defendant driver leaving the scene should be 
admitted. State v. Ford, 146 A. 828 (Conn. 1929); Vuillentot 
v. August J. Calverie & Co., 125 So. 168 (La. 1929); Greene-
wood v. Bailey, 184 So. 285 (Ala. 1938); Shaddy v. Daley, 76 
P.2d 279 (Id. 1938); Hallman v. Cushman, 13 S.E.2d 498 (So. 
Car. 1941); Petroleum Carrier Corporation v. Snyder, 161 
F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1947) (applying Georgia law); Brooks v. 
E.J. Willey Truck Transportation Co., 255 P.2d 801 (Cal. 
1953); Harrington v. Sharff, 305 F.2d 333 (2nd Cir. 1962); 
Dean v. Cole, 217 F.Supp. 280 (E.D. So. Car. 1963); Busbee 
v. Quassier, 172 So.2d 17 (Fla. 1965); Gaul v. Noiva, 230 
A.2d 591 (Conn. 591); Jones v. Strelecki, 49 N.J. 513, 231 
A.2d 558; Richards v. Office Products, 380 N.E.2d 725 (Ohio 
App. 1977); Johnson v. Austin, 280 N.W.2d 9 (Mich. 1979); 
Waycott v. Northeast Ins. Co., 465 A.2d 854 (Me. 1983). 
Evidence of post accident flight is probative for 
three separate reasons. First, the failure to stop evi-
dences a defendant's consciousness of responsibility. See, 
e.g., Brooks v. E.J. Willey Truck Transportation Co., 
supra.; Grzys v. Connecticut Co., 123 Conn. 605, 198 A. 259 
(1938); Shaddy v. Daley, supra.; Langenstein v. Reynaud, 13 
La. App. 272, 127 So. 764 (1930). Thus, leaving the scene 
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of the accident constitutes an admission by conduct. See, 
e.g. , Jones v. Strelecki, supra.; Gaul v. Noivaf supra.; 
Harrington v. Sharff, supra.; Shaddy v. Daley, supra.; 
Greenewood v. Bailey, supra.; Vuillemot v. August J. Cal-
verie & Co., supra. 
Secondly, flight from the scene raises an infer-
ence of failing to keep a proper lookout. An observant 
driver should have known that he struck something and would 
have stopped. Jones v. Strelecki, supra.; Busbee v. Quas-
sier, supra.; Vuillemot v. August J. Calverie & Co., supra. 
Finally, post-accident failure to stop evidences a 
willful, wanton, or reckless state of mind existing at the 
time of impact. e.g., Richards v. Office Products Co., 
supra.; Dean v. Cole, supra.? Hallman v. Cushman, supra. 
These inferences would have been valuable to the 
jury in assessing the credibility of the witnesses and in 
determining the outcome of this case. 
POINT II 
ANY POSSIBLE PREJUDICE 
WOULD NOT BE UNFAIR 
Evidence of post accident flight would not be 
unfairly prejudicial. Evidence is unfairly prejudicial only 
if it has "an undue tendency to suggest decision on an 
improper basis, commonly but not necessarily an emotional 
one." (Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 403.) 
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It has been stated that, "unfair prejudice as used 
in Rule 4 03 is not to be equated with testimony simply 
adverse to the opposing party. Virtually all evidence is 
prejudicial or it isn't material. The prejudice must be 
unfair." Dollar v. Long Mfg., N.C., Inc.y 561 F.2d 613, 618 
(5th Cir. 1977) . Although the hit-and-run evidence may be 
adverse to Trapp's case, it would not be unfair under 
Rule 403. 
POINT III 
THE PROBATIVE VALUE IS NOT 
SUBSTANTIALLY OUTWEIGHED 
Evidence of flight from the scene of an accident 
is highly probative. See, Point I, above. The Utah Rules 
of Evidence generally favor admissibility of all relevant 
evidence. Rules 401 and 402. 
However, before evidence is admitted, the court 
must weigh the probative value against possible "unfair 
prejudice." Whatever "unfair prejudice" may arise must 
substantially outweigh the probative value before the 
evidence is excluded. Rule 403. Roshan v. Fard, 705 F.2d 
102, 104-05 (4th Cir. 1983); United States v. Moore, 732 
F.2d 983, 989-92 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Any doubt should be 
resolved in favor of admitting the evidence. See Lilly, 
Evidence, §13 at 34. Where the probative value of proferred 
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evidence is significant, it is error to exclude it despite 
possible prejudicial effect. Roshan, supra.; Bowden v. 
McKenna, 600 F.2d 282 (1st Cir., 1979). 
The weight of authority clearly allows for the 
admission of the evidence of flight. No "unfair prejudice" 
would arise. See, Point II, above. Therefore, it was an 
abuse of discretion to fail to admit the evidence of flight. 
POINT IV 
FISHER'S SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS WERE AFFECTED 
Fisher's substantial rights were denied when the 
trial court refused to admit the evidence of Mr. Trapp's 
hit-and-run. 
First, without the hit-and-run evidence, Fisher 
was denied effective ammunition to challenge Trapp's testi-
mony. Fisher could not use the inference of guilt to 
impeach Trapp's testimony that he was paying attention to 
the road. (Record at 298-99.) Nor could Fisher rely on the 
inference to show Trapp's consciousness of responsibility 
for failing to see Fisher in front of him. (Record at 298.) 
See generally, 5 Am.Jur. 2d, "Appeal and Error", §802, 
n.9, 11. 
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Second, Fisher was denied the opportunity to fully 
and fairly cross-examine the defense witnesses. Due to the 
order jLn limine, Fisher could not question either the police 
investigator or the defense expert as to whether they were 
aware of the hit-and-run. Fisher could not ask whether they 
had considered the evidence of flight in reaching their 
opinions. This denial of full cross-examination was error 
effecting Fisher's substantial right. See generally, 
5 Am.Jur. 2df "Appeal and Error", §783 n.l and §809. 
Third, Fisher was not allowed to fully explore the 
opinion of his expert Val Shupe during the critical initial 
phases of trial. Mr. Shupe made an offer of proof that, in 
his opinion, Trapp was not keeping a proper lookout and was 
travelling too fast for existing conditions. (Record at 
334.) Fisher was not allowed to present this opinion 
evidence at that time due to lack of foundation. (Record at 
338.) Mr. Shupe was not allowed to rely on the inference of 
guilt arising from the hit-and-run. Had Mr. Shupe been able 
to rely on that inference, the trial court could not have 
questioned the adequacy of the foundation on which his 
opinion was based. Evidence of the hit-and-run testimony 
would also have lent credibility to Shupe's testimony when 
he was finally allowed to give his opinion on cause. (See 
Point VII herein.) 
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Finally, Fisher could not use the hit-and-run evi-
dence to rehabilitate the testimony of his brother, Patrick. 
Patrickfs testimony indicated that Trapp failed to see 
Fisher. (Record at 310.) Trapp attempted to impeach 
Patrick by laying the blame on Fisher. (Record at 312-20*) 
Fisher was prejudicially denied his opportunity at reha-
bilitation of Patrick because he could not bring up the 
hit-and-run. See generally, 5 Am.Jur. 2d, "Appeal and 
Error", §783 n.l. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence of flight from the scene of the 
accident is relevant under the standard provided in Rule 
401. All relevant evidence is admissible under Rule 402. 
The trial court found the evidence inadmissible under Rule 
403. However, the Court abused its discretion by failing to 
properly weigh the probative value of the evidence against 
its possible unfair prejudice to the defendant. The 
plaintiff's substantial rights were affected by not being 
allowed full cross examination and by not being able to rely 
on the influence of consciousness of responsibility to 
reinforce his witnesses testimony. Therefore, this Court 
should allow Fisher to present the hit-and-run evidence at a 
new trial. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS RELATING TO 
THE EXCLUSION OF EXPERT OPINION TESTIMONY 
Plaintiff called and certified Val Shupe (hereaf-
ter Shupe) as an accident reconstruction expert. (Record at 
320-21.) The defense raised no objection to Mr. Shupe1s 
qualifications. However, the defense objected when plain-
tiff attempted to present Shupe's opinion as to the cause of 
the accident. (Record at 328.) Shupe!s opinion was that 
Trapp1s inattention and excessive speed caused the accident. 
(Record at 334.) Defense counsel argued that there was 
insufficient foundation on which to base that opinion. 
(Record at 328-33.) 
Out of the hearing of the jury, plaintiff's expert 
recited the basis of his opinion: inspection, measurements 
and photographs of the accident scene, average running speed 
of a nine-year old child, and review of all pleadings, 
depositions and police reports of the case. (3^ d.) The 
Court agreed with defense counsel and excluded the expert 
opinion evidence on grounds of lack of foundation. (Record 
at 334 and 338.) However, the Court allowed Shupe to 
testify as to how far back Trapp was from the point of 
impact when Fisher began crossing the road. (Record at 
338.) 
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Later on in the trial, the Court allowed the 
defense expert to state his opinion as to the cause of the 
accident. The defense expert based his opinion on the same 
foundation that the plaintiff's expert had offered. (Record 
at 393.) Ultimately, the plaintiff's expert was allowed to 
state his opinion, but only in rebuttal, and only after 
supplemental foundation testimony. (Record at 427.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Failure of the trial court to receive plaintiff's 
expert opinion during plaintiff's case in chief was prejudi-
cial error. The error was not cured by later introduction 
of the opinion evidence. 
POINT V 
ADEQUATE FOUNDATION FOR SHUPE'S 
TESTIMONY EXISTED FROM THE BEGINNING 
The Utah Rules of Evidence permits an expert to 
give his opinion on an ultimate issue "without prior 
disclosure of the underlying facts or date." Utah Rule of 
Evidence, 705. When a judge requires some foundation, Rule 
703 defines what is required. Under Rule 703, the test to 
be applied is whether the materials the expert relies on 
"are of a type reasonably relied on by experts in the 
particular field in forming opinions or inferences. 
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The materials Shupe relied on were unquestionably 
"of a type reasonably relied on by experts in the particular 
field." As discussed in the "Fact" section, Shupe visited 
the accident site, measured it, read the depositions, read 
pleadings, reviewed the police report, took pictures, and 
conducted his own tests. (Record at 321-23, 326, 331, 
339-41.) 
The defense expert relied on the same information 
to reach his opinion. (Record at 381-93.) 
POINT VI 
WEAKNESSES IN THE FACTUAL 
UNDERPINNINGS GO TO WEIGHT, NOT ADMISSIBILITY 
As long as the information the expert relies on is 
of a type reasonably relied on by experts in the "particular 
field," the weakness in factual underpinnings go to weight 
rather than admissibility. Breider v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 
722 F.2d 1134, 1139 (3d Cir. 1983); American National Bank 
and Trust Co. v. K-Mart Corp., 717 F.2d 394, 400 (7th Cir. 
1983); Shurtleff v. Jay Tuft & Co., 622 P.2d 1168, 1173 
(Utah 1980) . Weaknesses in the factual underpinnings can be 
explored on cross-examination. Polk v. Ford Motor Co., 529 
F.2d 259 (8th Cir. 1976). 
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Defendant argued the expert testimony was inadmis-
sible for two reasons: First, that plaintiff's expert 
seemed unaware of cars traveling in the opposite direction. 
(Record at 330.) Second, that plaintiff's expert did not 
know how far plaintiff was from the edge of the pavement 
when plaintiff began to cross. (Record at 326.) 
The defense did not claim that plaintiff's expert 
was relying on information that was not usually relied on by 
accident reconstruction experts. The defense only argued 
that the information was somehow flawed. 
Courts consistently allow expert testimony over 
objections that the facts relied on may not have been 
exactly like those which existed in the case at issue. 
Shipp v. General Motors Corp., 750 F.2d 418f 427 (5th Cir. 
1985); Martell v. Boardwalk Enterprises, Inc., 748 F.2d 740, 
746-47 (2nd Cir. 1984); Brandt v. French, 638 F.2d 209, 212 
(10th Cir. 1981). In Kelsay v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 744 
F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1985), the court affirmed the admission 
of a relatively inexperienced police officer's opinion over 
objections that he did not make exact measurements. The 
Kelsay case is precisely on point. 
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POINT VII 
THE INITIAL EXCLUSION OF 
SHUPE'S OPINION WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
It was manifest error to exclude the plaintiff1s 
initial presentation of Shupe's opinion. In Edwards v. Di-
dericksen, 597 P.2d 1328 (Utah 1979)
 f this court recognized 
the importance of an expert's opinion on an ultimate issue. 
The court noted that "exclusion of an opinion as to an 
ultimate issue invites misunderstanding, confusion in the 
juror's minds." (Id., at 1330.) Such exclusion requires the 
jury "to speculate as to what conclusion or conclusions the 
technical facts logically support" and otherwise deprives 
the jury of valuable information. (Id.) 
An expert's opinion on the ultimate issue is 
highly relevant. When highly relevant evidence is excluded 
by manifest error, prejudicial error occurs. Davis v. 
Neels, 583 F.2d 337, 346 (7th Cir. 1978). Erroneous exclu-
sion of an expert's opinion on an ultimate issue requires 
reversal. See, e.g., Garrett v. Desa Industries, Inc., 705 
F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1983); Breider v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 
supra; American National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago 
v. K-Mart Corp., supra; In Re Air Crash in Bale, Indonesia, 
684 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982). 
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The defense may argue that the later admission 
cured the error. However, the prejudicial effect may have 
even been compounded by the later admission of the opinion. 
The plaintiff carries the burden of proof. He is granted 
the first chance to prove his case to the jury. Fisher did 
not get his "first shot" when Shupe's opinion was wrongfully 
found inadmissible. 
The problem only got worse from there. The 
defense expert was then allowed to give his opinion as to 
the ultimate cause of the accident. As in Edwards, supray 
the jury may have become confused and may have thought 
plaintiff's expert initially agreed with the defense expert. 
In an attempt to supply further foundation for his 
opinion, plaintiff's expert returned to the scene with 
Patrick. When called on rebuttal, Patrick testified that he 
remembered the location of Trapp's car as Fisher started 
into the street. 
This information changed a few facts on which 
Shupe originally relied in reaching his opinion. However, 
it did not change that opinion, it reinforced it. The jury 
did not know this. They may have assumed that Mr. Shupe's 
opinion was based exclusively on the "convenient memory" of 
Patrick. This would significantly taint the opinion of Mr. 
Shupe. 
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Although subsequent admission of evidence may cure 
the prior error, that is not the case where the testimony 
admitted is not as broad or comprehensive as that excluded. 
5A C.J.S., "Appeal and Error", §1753, n. 79. Johnson v. 
Malnati, 265 A.2d 394 (N.J. 1970). Nor is the initial error 
cured where the evidence is subsequently admitted under 
circumstances where it would likely be ignored, Brown v. 
Newby, 47 P.2d 1076) (Cal. App. 1935), or where the initial 
exclusion weakened its value. Gerbig v. Gerbig, 168 P. 2d 
837 (Mont. 1946); Daggett v. Wolff, 44 S.W.2d 1063 (Tex. 
1931). 
The basic standard for judging prejudice is 
whether "there is a reasonable likelihood that a more 
favorable result would have been obtained by the complaining 
party in the absence of error." Harris v. Utah Transit 
Authority, 671 P.2d 217, 222-23. (Utah 1983). That test is 
clearly met in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court's initial exclusion of Shupefs opinion 
was prejudicial error. Under the circumstances of the case, 
the initial exclusion was tantamount to total exclusion. 
The subsequently admitted opinion was given under circum-
stances where it would likely have been ignored. The 
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opinion was not as broad or comprehensive as it would have 
been had it been admitted during the critical initial phase 
of trial. Thus, under the circumstances, the initial error 
was not cured by the later admission of the testimony. A 
reasonable likelihood exists that a more favorable result 
would have occurred had the opinion been initially admitted. 
The case should be remanded for a new trial. 
DATED this 2*2 daY of 0^\^A^\Q€*!""" ' 1986. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys/fdr Appellant 
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RULE 103 
RULINGS ON EVIDENCE 
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error 
may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits 
or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of 
the party is affected, and 
(1) Objection, In case the ruling 
is one admitting evidence, a timely 
objection or motion to strike 
appears of record, stating the 
specific ground of objection, if 
the specific ground was not appar-
ent from the context; or 
(2) Offer of proof. In case the 
ruling is one excluding evidence, 
the substance of the evidence was 
made known to the court by offer or 
was apparent from the context 
within which questions were asked. 
(b) Record of offer and ruling. The 
court may add any other or further statement which 
shows the character of the evidence, the form in 
which it was offered, the objection made, and the 
ruling thereon. It may direct the making of an 
offer in question and answer form. 
(c) Hearing of jury. In jury cases, 
proceedings shall be conducted, to the extent 
practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible 
evidence from being suggested to the jury by any 
means, such as making statements or offers of 
proof or asking questions in the hearing of the 
jury. 
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(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule 
precludes taking notice of plain errors affecting 
substantial rights although they were not brought 
to the attention of the court, 
RULE 401 
DEFINITION OF "RELEVANT EVIDENCE" 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence 
having any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination 
of the action more probable or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence. 
RULE 40 2 
RELEVANT EVIDENCE GENERALLY 
ADMISSIBLE: IRRELEVANT 
EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE 
All relevant evidence is admissible, 
except as otherwise provided by the Constitution 
of the United States or the Constitution of the 
State of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by 
other rules applicable in courts of this State. 
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. 
RULE 40 3 
EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT 
EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF PREJUDICE, 
PREJUDICE, CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME 
Although relevant, evidence may be 
excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, 
or by considerations of undue delay, waste 
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence. 
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APPENDIX B 
RULE 70 2 
TESTIMONY BY EXPERTS 
If scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge will assist the trier 
of fact to understand the evidence or to de-
termine a fact in issue, a witness qualified 
as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education, may testify thereto 
in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
RULE 703 
BASES OF OPINION TESTIMONY BY EXPERTS 
The facts or data in the particular 
case upon which an expert bases an opinion or 
inference may be those perceived by or made 
known to him at or before the hearing. If of 
a type reasonably relied upon by experts in 
the particular field in forming opinions or 
inferences upon the subject, the facts or 
data need not be admissible in evidence. 
RULE 704 
OPINION ON ULTIMATE ISSUE 
Testimony in the form of an opinion 
or inference otherwise admissible is not ob-
jectionable because it embraces an ultimate 
issue to be decided by the trier of fact. 
RULE 705 
DISCLOSURE OF FACTS OR 
DATA UNDERLYING EXPERT OPINION 
The expert may testify in terms of 
opinion or inference and give his reasons 
therefor without prior disclosure of the 
underlying facts or data, unless the court 
requires otherwise. The expert may in any 
event be requried to disclose the underlying 
facts or data on cross-examination. 
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